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Abstract
Stylized facts for South Asia show the dominance of supply shocks, amplified by macroeconomic policies
and procyclical current accounts. Interest and exchange rate volatility rose initially on liberalization,
but fell as markets deepened. A gradual middling through approach to openness and market
development are helping the region absorb shocks without reducing growth. Diverse sources of demand,
flexible exchange rates, robust domestic savings, and changing political preferences are contributing.
Countercyclical policy more suited to structure, and removal of distortions raising costs, would allow
better coordination of monetary and fiscal polices to further support the process.
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We review the macroeconomic performance in South Asian countries, and analyze 
why despite opening out at a time of major international shocks they have done 
reasonably well. The reason may be a gradual middling through approach that 
combined opening and market development. The choice of flexible exchange rate 
regimes with restrained volatility contributed. But the exchange rate was not 
undervalued, unlike China. The region largely had a current account deficit. 
 
Perceptions of what are stable policy combinations in emerging markets tend to be 
driven by past crises. In Latin America fiscal profligacy resulted in repeated 
macroeconomic crises despite a variety of macro stabilization efforts. In East Asia 
crises occurred despite fiscal surplus because of too rapid financial liberalization 
combined with policies such as fixed exchange rates that created moral hazard. But 
conditions in South Asia (SA) differ. Although the region has fiscal deficits, large 
private savings cover government dissaving. Domestic debt ratios are manageable due 
to prospects of high catch-up growth absorbing labour in more productive 
occupations. Foreign debt is limited. 
 
We build a set of stylized facts, to identify unique features of the SA region, and 
analyze differences from other regions. Apart from quantity variables, we also seek to 
discover patterns and co-movements in time series for key prices such as interest 
rates, inflation, and exchange rates across the region. Examining why acceleration in 
growth accompanied openness would be instructive. 
   
Dualism in the SA labour market due to high population density and low per capita 
incomes affects macroeconomic outcomes, as do political systems. Similar features 
such as dualism should lead to convergence in macroeconomic policies, but differing 
  1political systems are a factor leading to divergence within SA. Experience in robust 
democracies differs from other countries. Democracies have a tendency to short-term 




Table 1 presents a comparative picture of key macroeconomic variables for SA 
economies in 2007. It shows general similarities in the region. All countries had a 
fiscal deficit, an export to GDP ratio in the twenties, and all except three ran a current 
account deficit. Although India’s foreign exchange reserves were the highest, all the 
countries held reserves, and all had flexible exchange rates (Table 3) pointing to some 
kind of managed floating. With some exceptions, growth rates were respectable and 
inflation rates moderate.  
 
Macroeconomic cycles, interpreted through optimizing behaviour, give interesting 
insights. For example, Calvo and Vegh (1999), explain the surge in Latin American 
consumption expenditure following exchange rate stabilization by its poor credibility 
and expected reversal.  Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argue more volatile trend growth, 
driven by policy instability, makes optimal consumption more volatile and the current 
account (CA) strongly counter-cyclical. Net exports (NX) fall as output, consumption, 
and imports rise. If the trend is the cycle for emerging markets, or shocks are regarded as 
permanent, optimal consumption should vary more than output as expected future 
income also rises. In mature markets the trend is stable, so consumption is smooth. 
   
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) derived business cycle characteristics—volatility through 
the standard deviation (σ) and autocorrelation (ρ)—or degree of co-movement in time 
series of macroeconomic variables. Their average values for 13 emerging, excluding SA 
economies, and 13 developed markets are reported in the last two columns of Table 1. 
We calculate yearly time series moments
1 for SA economies, since quarterly data are not 
available. So the table compares yearly to quarterly moments. But since they were 
worried about measurement errors in emerging market economy (EME) quarterly data, 
                                                 
1 The data are smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to remove short-run fluctuations. For 
quarterly series 1600 is used as the smoothing parameter. Since yearly data are observed only one-
fourth as often as quarterly data, the value used is 1600/4
4 = 6.25. Critical correlations were also 
calculated with unfiltered data and with 100 as the smoothing parameter with similar results.  
  2Aguiar and Gopinath also calculated unreported yearly moments, with similar results. 
They restrict their data to the 1980s and 1990s since the patterns were different in the 
1960s or 1970s when the EMEs were largely closed. Our data set runs for the post 
liberalization era in the SA region—calendar years 1980-2007. Since this populous 
region is a source of many migrants, remittances are important. So we also investigate 
the cyclicality of the current account (CA). The pattern Table 1 reveals is: 
 
1.  Output (Y) volatility is much higher in SA.   
2.  Volatility of C/I, I/Y, is much lower, implying a much higher volatility of 
consumption (C) and investment (I).  
3.  Volatility of growth rate, or log difference of output is higher. 
4.  Correlation of C and I with Y is much higher: close to 1 compared to 0.7. 
5.  Correlation of Y, Y-1 is higher, implying greater persistence of shocks, but that 
of growth rates is erratic, varying from high positive to negative. The growth 
correlation for India and Sri Lanka is close to that for the EME group.   
6.  Volatility of NX/Y is lower in India, Bangladesh, and Nepal but higher for the 
others.  
7.  Correlation of NX/Y with Y is high positive compared to high negative for the 
EME group and low negative for developed countries, that is, it is procyclical 
in SA
2. Correlation of CA/Y with Y is uniformly high and procyclical.  
 
Implications from these stylized facts: 
 
Higher volatility of Y, C, I, and growth: More shocks, less ability to smooth shocks.  
Higher C, I correlation with Y, less volatile C, I ratios: Less developed financial 
markets, or less wealth so C is limited by income. Or shocks are regarded as 
temporary, so rather than borrowing for C, savings rise. Higher C, I volatility does not 
drive income volatility, but follows it. So C, I are not the source of variation. Shocks 
are primarily to supply, and induced demand multiplication must be coming largely 
from policy.  
 
                                                 
2 Exceptions are very low countercyclical for India (-0.03 with a smoothing parameter of 100), and 
very high countercyclical for Nepal. 
  3NX procyclical: This can happen though export driven growth, especially services 
export, and remittances, so NX rises with output. Alternatively, if a deflationary oil 
price shock raises the import bill NX would fall with output. The CA then is a source 
of shocks. Since policy influences the CA, policy that magnified shocks could make 
NX more procyclical. 
Correlation of Y, Y-1 higher, but of growth low: More persistent shocks but more 
changes over time as growth accelerates in the transition economies. India’s famous 
low and steady “Hindu rate of growth” is very much in the past.  
 
Supply side shocks are to be expected in economies that are still agriculture 
dependent, have severe infrastructure bottlenecks, and are dependent on oil imports. 
To the extent the latter rise in booms they tend to make NX countercyclical, but the 
other factors must be dominating. 
 
Table 3 reports averages and standard deviations of exchange rate depreciation
3, 
inflation, and short and long interest rates for 3 countries for pre- and post reform 
periods, and the post-Asian crisis period over our data set. Prior to the liberalizing 
reforms, administered price and quantitative interventions repressed markets and kept 
volatility low, in a fragile equilibrium that broke down under large shocks such as the 
external crisis in 1991. In the first reform decade, as controls were gradually lifted and 
markets freed, volatility increased. Although openness was itself a source of shocks it 
increased diversity, which together with the deepening of markets reduced volatility.  
The pattern shows up clearly in ten year moving averages of both average and 
standard deviation. There is an initial low, then rise fall pattern in volatility—
reflecting the shift from restraints to markets and openness, with development of 
markets and institutions bringing fluctuations down by the third decade. In good times 
volatility is generally low—there are less external shocks; in deep markets also 
volatility is low. The smaller SA countries tend to be more open and were more 
strongly affected by external shocks. They had less market and capital account 
controls, and more government and international debt. Nepal also shows the up down 
pattern; Bangladesh shows a steady down.  In Pakistan and Sri Lanka internal unrest 
and political instability vitiated the pattern.   
                                                 
3 Calculated as the percentage change in average monthly local currency/USD rates. 
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Over 1996-2003 average interest rates rose sharply and their volatility exceeded that 
of exchange rates, partly due to the East Asian crisis and the use of interest rate 
defense. The volatility of capital flows was less than that of the current account 
deficit
4, since these policies impacted the latter. Although Indian exchange and 
interest rate volatility both were below other developing countries, interest rate 
volatility exceeded that of developed countries while exchange rate volatility was less. 
Thus exchange rate movements were restricted at the cost of higher interest rate 
movements. Even so, Table 3 clearly shows movements in the local currency/dollar 
rate so SA exchange rate regimes were not dollar pegs.  
 
Less effective democratic pressures in Pakistan and Sri Lanka may have contributed 
to higher average inflation and depreciation there. Pakistan had military regimes for 
long periods. Despite similar low per capita incomes, more volatility of inflation 
seems to have been acceptable than in democratic India, as Table 3 and the experience 
with international food price shocks suggests. The region was severely impacted by 
the food and oil price shocks over 2007 and 2008. With political instability, capital 
outflows, and low reserves, Pakistan had to turn to the IMF for a rescue package. The 
sharp rise in interest rates imposed led to growth becoming negative from an 
impressive 7 percent over 2000-07. The international rise in foodgrain prices was 
passed on contributing to double-digit inflation. But inflation dropped to low single 
digits by 2009
5. In India also procurement prices were raised but not as much, food 
price inflation was lower but more persistent as the price support system prevented 
domestic prices from falling when international prices fell. 
 
Since output volatility exceeded consumption volatility, the latter was not an 
independent source of shocks. This may not continue as the region develops. In some 
parameters of Table 2, India is coming closer to EMEs. Careful sequencing of reforms is 
important to prevent excessive volatility. Countercyclical policy must be established and 
succeed in smoothing shocks before full financial deepening and capital account 
convertibility. 
 
                                                 
4 The coefficient of variation of the CAD was –1.97 compared to only 0.19 for foreign inflows. 
5 In Sri Lanka inflation fell from 28.2 per cent in June 2008 to 4.8 per cent at end 2009. 
  5Historical Narrative: Economic and Political Structure and Policy Choices  
The stylized facts were the outcome of a long process that built in perverse incentives. 
We examine this for India. 
 
Economic Structure and Shocks 
India has a large population and low per capita income levels, high poverty ratios and 
therefore a large share of food in the average consumption basket. Even 60 years after 
independence during most of which there was a steady rate of growth of about 5 
percent, which accelerated after reforms in the 1990’s, the poverty ratio was in the 
twenties.  
 
The post World War II control regime was continued to target accelerated equitable 
development, according to the ideas of the time. Large investment projects were all in 
the public sector, but there was also an active private sector. This mixed economy 
worked reasonably until the late sixties when there was a growth slowdown, partly 
due to a series of monsoon failures, given the dependence on rain fed agriculture. 
Inefficiencies were growing due to the largely closed import substitution regime, 
controls that turned industry to rent seeking, and the failure to carry out land reforms 
and develop a broad demand base.  
 
The early seventies saw severe oil shocks, and sharp peaks in inflation, which hurt the 
poor. Since the latter were a large vote block, several user charges were kept fixed, 
which led to more and more distortions.  
 
Political and Administrative Changes 
Political fragmentation made matters worse. As the Congress Party lost dominance 
and intense multi party competition set in, populist schemes multiplied, although 
targeting was poor and waste and corruption proliferated. With multiple competing 
parties, swing votes became very important for winning in the first-past-the-post 
system. India's poverty, caste, religious and regional heterogeneity added to the 
effects of the electoral structure. Identity politics, based on caste and religion, was a 
way of cultivating these swing voters. Frequent elections after state elections were 
separated from those at the Centre in 1971, kept this pressure up continually. The 
democratic empowerment of the poor was a positive and necessary development, but 
  6symbolic gestures and handouts dominated in the poor Northern States. In the South 
where the movement was older, it achieved progressive reform, emphasizing 
education.  
 
Administrative choices made amounted to protecting the poor through current 
transfers, rather than building their assets and human capital, when it was the latter 
that was the sustainable option. This was a rational social outcome under pessimistic 
growth projections because the rich could often escape imposts in the long-term, and 
the poor had high discount rates.  
 
The objective of providing government services at affordable prices led to cross-
subsidization both in the provision of specific products and across government 
functions. Low price caps for many public goods led to systematic incentives to lower 
quality and investment. Thus falling efficiency and rising costs compounded the 
problem of low user charges, and prevented a natural fall in prices from 
improvements in technology and organization. But where the government had 
monopoly power and was servicing the rich, prices were raised much above costs of 
production. Or indirect charges, not obvious to voters, such as the prices of 
intermediate goods, were raised. As the rich turned to private providers, revenue 
losses contributed to the inability to service the poor adequately. Cross-subsidization 
was no longer sufficient to cover costs. General revenues did not even cover 
government consumption expenditures. Populist fiscal response to supply shocks had 
a cumulative effect in trend worsening of public finances and growing public debt. 
The government began borrowing to finance current consumption in 1980-81 and was 
never able to return to a balanced budget. Once implemented, the policies set in 
vicious self-sustaining dynamics by creating favoured constituencies or interest 
groups. 
 
As fund constraints appeared, it was easiest to postpone investment plans. The 
financial sector was repressed, with large statutory liquidity requirements that helped 
meet government borrowing requirements, and an administered interest rate structure. 
Such quantitative measures restricted money supply growth despite automatic 
financing of government deficits. The interest rate structure was kept high, and many 
administered prices kept artificially low, but with a chronic upward bias. The 
  7Government maintained stocks of the major foodgrains with the objectives of food 
security and price smoothing. Procurement prices were often raised to give incentives 
to farmers who were also an important vote block, concentrated in a few States. 
Consumers were subsidized through a leaky public distribution system. The price 
gaps and costs of storage contributed to a mounting subsidy burden.   
 
Macroeconomic Policy 
Early macroeconomic policy was geared to support planned expenditures. During an 
agricultural shock monetary policy would initially support increased drought relief 
then tighten just as the lagged demand effects of an agricultural slowdown were 
hitting industry. Administered oil and food prices were normally raised with a lag 
after monetary tightening brought inflation rates down. Macro policy was thus pro-
cyclical, but pervasive controls limited volatility. Severe drought and terms of trade 
shocks over 1965-67, led to a fiscal tightening, with a cut in deficits and in public 
investment. Monetary policy following a monetary targeting approach, was non-
accommodating but not severe. Fiscal-monetary policies were closely linked, as the 
budget deficit was automatically financed. Severe monetary and fiscal measures 
followed the oil price plus agricultural supply shock over 1973-75. In both cases there 
was an unnecessary loss of output. A focus on expanding supply would have been 
more effective. There was no demand contraction after the 1979-80 oil shock; a cut in 
public investment and sharp monetary tightening was avoided. Recovery was rapid, 
but deficits and supply side inadequacies continued. 
 
Since the seventies, dominant development ideas were changing to favour openness. 
In India also the ill effects of controls were becoming obvious. Some liberalization 
started in the mid-eighties, but a major thrust for external openness came from a 
balance of payment crisis in the early nineties. Current account and partial capital 
account liberalization, and a gradual move to more flexible exchange rates followed. 
Sequencing was well thought out. While controls continued on domestic portfolios 
and debt inflows, equity inflows were liberalized. Equity shares risks, while short-
term debt flows create a heavy repayment burden in adverse times. On foreign debt, 
the sequence of relaxation favoured commercial credit and longer term debt.     
 
  8Post reform macro-stabilization included a cut in public investment, monetary 
tightening partly to sterilize capital inflows, and an artificial agricultural supply shock 
as procurement prices for food grains were raised. A benchmark real effective 
exchange rate was set after two-stage devaluation in the early nineties, in order to 
maintain a competitive real exchange rate and encourage exports. It was largely 
maintained. The nominal rate was kept stable for long periods of time, and reserves 
accumulated under inflows. Growth revived in 1993-94, and monetary policy was 
accommodating, but exchange rate volatility in 1995 led to a monetary squeeze that 
precipitated a slowdown. The monetary stance was relaxed, but reversed again at the 
first sign of exchange rate volatility. Periodic bursts of volatility were subdued. 
Although the exchange rate was said to be market determined, massive RBI 
intervention continued in order to absorb foreign portfolio inflows. Trend depreciation 
covered the inflation differential. There was some appreciation due to the weakening 
of the dollar from 2002 and mild two-way movement of the nominal exchange rate 
from 2004. Foreign exchange reserves accelerated in this period. 
  
After the adverse impact of the nineties peak in interest rates, monetary policy 
switched to a multiple indicator approach. There was no formal inflation targeting but 
the policy statements gave both inflation control and facilitating growth as key 
objectives. A specific value of 5 percent was given as the desirable rate of inflation, 
with the aim to bring it even lower in the long-term.  
 
Throughout this period, gradual financial reforms deepened markets. As most interest 
rates stopped being administered, it became a more effective policy instrument. With 
the implementation of the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) in 2001 policy was 
largely successful in keeping call money rates between the LAF bands determined by 
the repo and reverse repo rates, which began to be changed frequently and smoothly. 
FX markets had the highest growth rates in the world. The RBI now had more 
independence with no automatic monetization or devolvement of primary issues of 
government securities. The fiscal deficit fell after a long time, with higher growth and 
lower interest rates, when the opposite policy of periodic rise in interest rates had not 
succeeded in reducing deficits over 1997-02. But the lowering occurred not from 
conscious policy design but because international interest rates were falling. 
 
  9Inflation rose after the severe international food price and oil shocks over 2007-08 
prompted a steep monetary tightening despite slowing industrial output. The global 
crisis worsened the industrial crash. International credit froze, trade fell, domestic 
liquidity dried up due to outflows, and fear stalled consumption and investment plans. 
But the global push for concerted macroeconomic stimulus allowed Indian 
macroeconomic policy, despite high government debt, to be countercyclical for the 
first time. Fiscal stimulus amounted to about 3 percent of GDP. RBI made available 
potential primary liquidity of about 7 percent of GDP. Just after the crisis India was 
regarded as a high-risk country with low fiscal capacity, but the rapid monetary-fiscal 
response helped give it a V-shaped recovery with one of the highest growth rates (6.7 
percent). The financial system remained sound. The potential of countercyclical 
macroeconomic policy was demonstrated. 
 
Analysis of Macroeconomic Policies  
The brief macroeconomic narrative history corroborates the frequent supply shocks 
and also shows a large impact of demand on output. A simple analytical framework 
consistent with this structure is developed below and used to examine the effect of 
shocks, openness, issues of monetary and fiscal coordination, and sustainable debt and 
deficits. The results generalize to SA countries that share the crucial feature of high 
productivity growth releasing labor, thus allowing an elastic supply response. 
  
Structure and Shocks 
During a catch-up period of high growth, as a large labour force shifts to more 
productive occupations, longer-run aggregate supply (LAS) is elastic (Figure 1), but 
frequent adverse supply shocks push it upwards. Since output is responsive over time, 
inflationary expectations raise costs over current output ranges rather than only at full 
employment. The LAS becomes vertical only as the economy matures and full 
productive employment is reached. If labour mobility is high, this provides a better 
framework of analysis compared to traditional two-sector dual economy models. 
 
In India, monsoon failures or international oil price shocks have been dominant 
inflation triggers. Propagation mechanisms such as the political administrative 
features discussed above convert these into low chronic cost-push inflation (Goyal 
1999, 2007). For example, the political pressures from farmers push up farm support 
  10prices, with consumption subsidies also going up. But these are inadequate due to 
corruption and failures of targeting
6, and food has a large share in the consumption 
basket. So nominal wages rise with a lag, pushing up costs and generating second 
round inflation from a temporary supply shock. Political support also raises wages 
through minimum wages and employment schemes
7. If monetary tightening pushes 
the demand curve leftwards along a flat supply curve, the cost in output sacrifice is 
high with little impact on inflation. It is the upward creep in the supply curve that 
affects the latter. But as fiscal populism increases demand, money supply is often 
tightened as an offset. 
 
Empirical tests support the elastic long-run supply and the dominance of supply 
shocks. They demonstrate endogenous amplification of supply shocks through 
reductions in demand, during growth slowdowns. An estimated aggregate supply 
curve also shows a negative impact on inflation of a potential output gap and real 
appreciation (Goyal and Pujari, 2005).   
 
But strategies to fight inflation can be designed within this structure. A cost shock 
creates a short-run tradeoff between inflation and output variability. Instead of relying 
solely on monetary tightening to bring down inflation, more nuanced policies that 
shift down the supply curve could be followed. For example, exchange rate 
appreciation, or fiscal measures such as tax-tariff rates, and freer imports. Early mild 
tightening signaling further response as required can anchor inflationary expectations 
and prevent the second-round wage-price spiral without a sharp demand contraction. 
Greater interest and exchange rate flexibility make more monetary policy options 
available.  
 
The labor market structure implies output is below potential. If food prices are stable, 
capital is available, specific bottlenecks are alleviated and institutional reforms 
undertaken, supply will not be a constraint on output. 
 
                                                 
6 After his visit to Kalahandi in Orissa the late Rajiv Gandhi said only about 15 percent of money 
meant for the poor actually reaches them. A Supreme Court panel passed severe strictures on the public 
distribution scheme in 2010, corroborating this assessment. 
7 There is no problem if average wages rise with agricultural productivity. But the push to minimum 
wages, without the latter, under the national rural employment guarantee, may have contributed to the 
rise in consumer price inflation since 2007. 
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Openness after liberalizing reforms, leading to rise and fluctuations in capital flows, 
were a new source of shocks. Even so, sequenced capital controls and flexible 
exchange rates gave some degrees of freedom for monetary policy. Deep markets are 
a pre-requisite for more complete capital account convertibility. But policy magnified 
shocks from openness instead of smoothing them in this period. Improvements in 
policy were possible, including further evolution of exchange rate regimes. 
 
More flexibility of the exchange rate allows a smoother and more counter-cyclical 
interest rate. Some exchange rate volatility forces hedging to reduce currency risk, 
thus reducing the probability of currency crises. While limited volatility develops 
markets, high volatility encourages greater entry of noise traders and more speculative 
activity. Thin markets require intervention to maintain volatility within bounds. But 
too predictable or unidirectional movements encourage speculative positions. Despite 
steady reforms in Indian foreign exchange (FX) markets and some two-way rupee 
movement, firms lost a lot of money from bets on a trend appreciation when the 
global financial crisis led to large depreciation. Movement in a 10 band is sufficient to 
make such positions unattractive since potential losses from an incorrect position 
become large. 
 
Limited volatility is consistent with maintaining a trend competitive real effective 
exchange rate. There is evidence such volatility does not have a large effect on trade 
while currency crises adversely affect trade. If crises are avoided, interest rates lowered, 
and the longer-term exchange rate kept near competitive rates, trade is benefited. 
 
In open economies with a large share of imported consumer goods, the exchange rate 
can be the fastest transmission channel to consumer prices. In India oil imports, which 
have a high pass through of exchange rate changes, dominate. As border prices begin 
to affect domestic food prices the exchange rate becomes important for the domestic 
political economy. Some agricultural liberalization and falling world food prices did 
reduce these pressures and therefore inflation. An appreciation when border prices 
rise can reduce political pressures that raise agricultural procurement prices and abort 
a rise in wages. Appreciation when there is a negative supply shock, lowering 
intermediate goods and food prices, differs from fixing the exchange rate to bring 
  12down high levels of inflation, which led to real appreciation and often ended in a 
crisis in Latin American exchange-based stabilization episodes. Two-way movement 
only pre-empts the effect of temporary supply shocks on the domestic price-wage 
process. An exchange rate policy that lowers food price inflation reduces the necessity 
for subsidies and administered prices that distort incentives and lower efficiency. 
Building in a rule whereby there is an automatic response to a supply shock avoids the 
tendency to do nothing until it becomes necessary to over-react. Actions linked to 
exogenous shocks also avoid moral hazard. 
 
Such nominal changes can counter temporary shocks. But permanent shocks require 
productivity improvements. Without a rise in productivity, real appreciation would 
occur through inflation, requiring nominal depreciation as correction. 
 
Thus an exchange rate regime can stimulate the real sector, support external balance 
over the long run, lower inflation and stabilize the FX market (Cordon, 2002). The 
contribution to lowering inflation increases the Central Bank’s ability to adapt interest 
rates to the domestic cycle and achieve vital political goals.  
 
Monetary-Fiscal Coordination 
The post reform Indian macro policy combination was largely fiscal loosening and 
monetary tightening. Why did this continue despite the adverse consequences that 
inevitably followed in a framework such as Figure 1, where demand contraction has a 
large effect on output and little on inflation?  
 
Reforms repeatedly aimed to improve fiscal health. But a norm of political populism 
had set in, where inclusion was sought through short-term transfers. The Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act enacted in 2003 was not 
designed to protect investment, so productive expenditure was cut to continue populist 
spending. The former would have improved human, social, and physical capital, and 
therefore the supply response. Given fiscal populism, cost creep, and political 
sensitivity to inflation, the RBI, which was still not fully independent, was often 
forced to tighten. Moreover, interest elasticities were thought to be low, with a large 
subsistence sector little impacted by interest rates. The impact of recently freed 
  13interest rates on elasticities, in particular on consumer durable spending, housing, etc. 
was not yet fully understood.  
 
Sustainable Debt and Fiscal Reform 
High Indian growth despite high deficits is regarded as a puzzle. But to associate high 
Indian deficit ratios with higher risk is to extrapolate unconditionally from Latin 
American crisis where these features were found together. These countries had low 
savings rates and low population densities. But Indian private savings are high enough 
to cover for some government dissaving, thus preventing a large current account 
deficit and potential currency crises. Moreover, once high catch-up growth is 
established in a populous country deficit and debt ratios reduce. Government 
expenditure that helps maintain growth is sustainable, since debt ratios fall as the 
denominator of the ratio and revenues rise. 
 
Higher growth did reduce debt levels, but large expenditures to increase the 
consumption of the poor, given the government’s goal of inclusive growth, moderated 
deficit reduction in the second high growth period 2003-08 (Goyal 2010). A 
permanent rise in expenditure in excess of taxing capacity, can lead to instability.  
 
The FRBM Act of 2003 brought down only reported deficits, which were on track to 
meet announced targets before global shocks hit. But the episodes exposed the 
inadequate attention paid to incentives and escape clauses in formulating the Act. 
Loopholes, such as off budget oil bonds, were used to maintain the letter of the law 
even while violating its spirit. Targets were mechanically achieved, compressing 
essential expenditure on infrastructure, health and education, while maintaining 
populist subsidies. A new path of fiscal consolidation proposed by the 13
th Finance 
commission in 2010 drew heavily on and ought to maintain India’s growth dividend. 
But there was only a gentle attempt to prevent the Centre’s favoured ploy of reducing 
capital expenditure. Stricter constraints on the revenue deficit and more bite for the 
medium term fiscal plan were suggested. But more incentives are required for 
compliance. This could include selective expenditure caps, detailed targets for 
individual ministries, and levels of government, as part of improved accounting, 
including shifts from cash to accrual based accounts. Continuing improvement in tax 
  14rates, structure, and administration, as well as higher growth, are however, 
contributing to tax buoyancy.  
 
The RBI successfully managed higher government borrowings to limit crowding out 
of private borrowing through staggered placement of government debt, open market 
operations through the term structure, and preponing of government borrowing in 
periods of slack private demand. If the composition of fiscal expenditure changes to 
improve the supply response, monetary policies can also be recast to support growth 
allowing better fiscal-monetary coordination. 
 
Conclusion 
The South Asian region demonstrates the virtues of middling through. Pragmatic 
reforms avoided ideological extremes. Stylized facts show the dominance of supply 
shocks, and a procyclical current account, both amplified by macroeconomic policy. 
Interest and exchange rate volatility rose initially on liberalization, but fell with steady 
market development. Shocks continue to be large and frequent, but diverse sources of 
demand, robust domestic savings, gradual market development and endogenous 
improvement in institutions are helping absorb shocks without reducing growth. 
Procyclical policy used to magnify shocks, but the global crisis has demonstrated the 
feasibility and utility of a smoothing policy response. Such a policy would be more 
suited to structure and the process of change. Together with reduction in cost raising 
distortions, it would allow better coordination between monetary and fiscal polices, 
and fuller use of additional instruments liberalization and openness has made 
available. 
 
The region seems safely settled on a catch-up high growth path, where its chief 
strength is its large labour endowment transferring to more productive work. This 
demographic profile reduces the risk from government debt and deficits as long as 
government expenditures enable the supply response from the large numbers willing 
and able to work. While in a low growth environment, indirect benefits maybe 
discounted because of their uncertainty and greater chance of going to others, as 
opportunities accelerate voters prefer being equipped to make use of them. There are 
signs it is happening, but policies need to improve more to fully energize the 
individual and the society, even while protecting vulnerable sections. 
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  16Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for South Asian Countries 
(2007, percent of gross domestic product unless otherwise noted) 
  Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan  India  Maldives Nepal Pakistan  Sri 
Lanka 
GDP per 
capita ($)  350.1 486.8  1,664.8  1,028.7  3,470.5  390.8  910.0  1,616.1 
GDP Growth  11.5 6.4  17.0  9.0  7.6  2.6  6.8  6.8 
Inflation  13.0 7.2  5.2  4.7  7.4  6.4  7.8  15.8 
Fiscal Balance   
 










3.6   3.3  12.9  15.0  3.1  8.9  4.5  2.9 
Money Supply 
(M2)  21.6 45.3  59.5  85.2  73.8  54.4  50.6  39.2 
Bank Deposits
  10.9 39.5  46.0  68.0  64.9  29.9  79.4  65.3 
Government 
debt   18.9  (2006) 39.40  81.4  56.4 53.1 56 51.2 76.7 
External debt   3.6 3.3  12.9  15  8.9  3.1  4.5  2.9 
Foreign 
investment   5.4 2.7    5.2  8.01    6.1  2.3 
Note: ( ) = negative 
Sources: Statistical appendix and note a, ADB Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008. 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/South-Asia-Economic-Report/2009/chap2.pdf. Government debt: CIA world fact book; 
External debt: www.adb.org  
 
Table 2: South Asian Volatilities Compared to Other Emerging and Developed Markets 
  India   Pakistan  Sri 




σ(Y)  16.94 21.38  25.34 33.10  45.13 39.46 2.74  1.34 
σ(ΔY)  3.20 2.93  2.33 1.23  2.45 1.57 1.87  0.95 
ρ(Yt, Yt-1)  0.9981 0.9991  0.9987 0.9999  0.9996 0.9999 0.76  0.75 
ρ(ΔYt, ΔYt-1)  0.27 -0.10  0.21 0.57  0.61 -0.08  0.23  0.09 
σ(C)/σ(Y)  1  0.97  0.92 1.09  0.995  0.85 1.45  0.94 
σ(I)/ σ(Y)  1.59 1.02  0.98 1.59  1.07 1.06 3.91  3.41 
σ (NX/Y)  0.72 3.46  3.32 0.43  1.55 7.96 3.22  1.02 
σ (CA/Y)  0.77 2.24  2.87 6.97  0.10      
ρ (NX/Y,Y)  0.14 0.65  0.70 0.25  -0.84  0.80 -0.51  -0.17 
ρ (CA/Y,Y)  0.69 0.20  0.79 0.85  0.85      
ρ (C,Y)  1  0.996  0.9999 0.998  0.9998 0.99  0.72  0.66 
ρ (I,Y)  0.99 0.99  0.99 0.996  0.998  0.998  0.77  0.67 
Note: The last two columns list average values of standard deviations in percentages and correlations using quarterly data for 13 
developed economies and 13 emerging economies, excluding South Asia. (Source Aguiar and Gopinath 2007). The moments for 





  17Table 3: Averages and Volatilities of Inflation, Exchange and Interest Rates 
  









1981-92        
Average 10.7  8.1  11.3  16.8 
Standard dev  7.4  3.3  3.6  0.8 
1992-99       
Average 8.5  7.2  10.2  15.2 
Standard dev  6  3.1  3.7  2 
1999-2007       
Average 1.2  4.9  6.5  11.6 
India 
Standard dev  4.9  1.3  1.7  0.8 
          
1981-92        
Average 8.5  11.3  19.3  14.6 
Standard dev  4.2  11.8  4.1  3.4 
1992-99       
Average 7  7.9  22.9  17.3 
Standard dev  2.9  5.9  8.5  2.2 
1999-2007       
Average 6.3  7.8  13.6  13.4 
Sri Lanka 
Standard dev  5  7.5  7  3.3 
          
1981-92        
Average 8.2  8.1  7.7  9.1 
Standard dev  5.5  2.8  1.2  1.4 
1992-99       
Average 9.6  10.2  10.2  10.9 
Standard dev  3.8  5  1.7  4 
1999-2007       
Average 3.9  6.4  6.5  5.7 
Pakistan 
Standard dev  6.4  2.2  2.8  2 
Note: The long interest rate reported in the last column is Commercial Lending Rate-Prime for India, 













































List of acronyms 
CA- Current Account 
SA- South Asia 
NX- Net exports 




IMF-International Monetary Fund 
RBI-Reserve Bank of India 
LAF-Liquidity Adjustment Facility 
GDP-Gross Domestic Product 
LAS-Longer-run Aggregate Supply 
FRBM-Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
FX- Foreign Exchange  
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